Despite the importance of expectations in models of decision behavior under uncertainty, few empirical economists have made use of subjective expectations data in estimating such models. Assuming that expectations about future behavior accurately portray optimal future behavior conditional on current information, it is shown that such data can provide similar information about the decision process as can data on current or retrospective behavior. The value of self-reported choice expectations is illustrated by using information on respondents expected future occupation in the estimation of a structural dynamic model of teacher career decisions under uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, economists have become increasingly involved in the collection, measurement and analysis of subjective expectations. The interest in subjective expectations is not surprising given the importance of expectations in economic models of intertemporal decision making and in models of decision-making under uncertainty more generally. These models typically relate the distribution of choices to the distribution of preferences and expectations in the population. The goal in standard revealed preference analysis is then to infer individuals decision rules and preferences from observed choice behavior. However, as pointed out by Manski (1993; 2002) , without placing much structure on the problem, preferences and expectations often cannot both be recovered from the choice distribution alone. The degree of underidentification is often severe, as shown for example by Magnac and Thesmar (2002) in the context of dynamic discrete decision models, with observed choices generally found to be consistent with several combinations of expectations and preferences.
Reflecting a relative scarcity of subjective expectations data, skepticism about their reliability, as well as an absence of an appropriate methodology for incorporating these data in the estimation of structural models, the approach prevalent in the economic literature has been to make strong untested assumptions on expectations, and to infer preferences conditional on the maintained assumptions. Typically it is assumed that agents in the model use the same information as that available to the researcher, do so in the same way, and with expectations being rational, with their subjective probability distributions coinciding with the true probability distributions.
1 Misspecification of the information set or of the expectations formation process generally will lead to biased preference parameter estimates (Manski 1993) .
In fact, relatively little is known about how individual agents form expectations: about what is in their information set, how such information is used and how expectations are 1 An alternative approach that also does not make use of expectations data but which does not impose explicit assumptions about the expectations formation process is that adopted by Houser, Keane and McCabe (2010) . In modeling and analyzing choice behavior in an experimental dynamic game they specify expected total future payoffs (reflecting expected future choices and payoffs) as a flexible function of state variables. Using data on observed choices they then use model estimates to categorize individuals' behavior into three different types, which they label "near-rational", "fatalistic" and "confused".
updated over time. In recent years several economists have begun to collect and use subjective expectations data to investigate their validity, information content and the way they are correlated with characteristics of individuals and their environments (Manski 2004 ). In addition, they have started to explore how such data can be combined with choice data to recover preferences under milder assumptions on how agents evaluate the likelihood of future events. While this promising line of research is relatively new and substantial hurdles remain, its potential for improving our limited understanding of a key element of many models of economic decision making has already become abundantly apparent.
This paper provides an illustration of the value of subjective expectations data in studying economic behavior. More specifically, it shows how frequently available expectations regarding future choice decisions can be incorporated into the estimation of structural dynamic choice models. Just as current choices are taken to portray optimal behavior given current information, expectations about future choices portray optimal future behavior conditional on current information. These data can therefore provide useful information about the decision process in the same way as do data on current or retrospective behavior. Like differences in actual choices, differences in reported expectations can therefore be explained using the same behavioral model.
The expectations data used in this study represent respondents' expectations about their personal occupation and employment status several years into the future. While showing the value of such data in estimating a structural dynamic model of teacher career choices, it is important to note that the methodology adopted here is applicable to the study of other choice decisions and to other types of expectations data as well. The recent study by van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2009) represents another example of the applicability of this approach.
In estimating a structural model of retirement and saving decisions, it exploits expectations data on a large set of future events, including the individuals expected date of retirement, expected social security benefits as well as self-reported longevity and bequest expectations.
In this study I show how expectations data can be combined with data on actual choices to obtain more precise parameter estimates, while assuming that the two data sources used are consistent, that is, assuming that the expectations data were generated by the same model governing the actual choices. 23 In addition, along the lines proposed by Wolpin and Gonul (1985) , I will use estimates of the model obtained from data on observed behavior alone to test whether the reported expectations, which must be a function of the same structural parameters, are consistent with this model.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of the recent literature on the use of expectations data in studying economic decision behavior.
A simple dynamic model of occupational choice and career mobility is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the data set and the estimation of the model, followed by a brief discussion of the parameter estimates. Section 5 describes the self reported expectations data, presents validation tests of these data, and discusses the manner in which they can be incorporated in the estimation of the structural model. Estimates obtained after incorporating the expectations data are also presented. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding comments and areas for future research.
II. EARLIER STUDIES USING EXPECTATIONS DATA
Over the past two decades there has been a marked increase in interest among economists in the measurement and analysis of individuals subjective expectations (Manski 2004 (Dominitz and Manski 1997a; 1997b) and surveys conducted as part of the New York Fed's Household Inflation Expectations Project (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2010 ) have elicited respondents subjective probability distributions of various personal and macroeconomic events. In addition to asking for a respondents point forecast or a percent chance assigned to binary outcomes, these surveys elicit probability distributions reflecting respondents beliefs and uncertainty about future realizations of continuous variables.
Increased data collection and improved measurement has led to a rapidly growing number of studies involving subjective expectations data. Studies in which such data have been used can be broadly divided into two groups. The first group has been mainly concerned with testing the properties and validity of the reported expectations and analyzing its determinants and co-variates. Many of these studies aim to test for rationality, that is, whether expectations are unbiased and use all available information, by comparing expectations to actual realizations. Some studies of this type include Griliches (1980) , Hamermesh (1985) , Bernheim (1988 Bernheim ( , 1990 , Honig (1994) , Hurd and McGarry (1995) , Hurd et al (2004 Galati et al (2010) .
In the second group of studies self-reported expectations about future events or decisions have been used to help explain observed choice decisions. In earlier studies of this type most analyses were reduced form in nature. For example, Bernheim and Levin (1989) used subjective expectations about future social security benefits to help explain current savings behavior. Sandell and Shapiro (1980) , Shaw and Shapiro (1987) , Gronau (1988) and Blau and Ferber (1991) used reported plans of future labor market separations and subjective preferences for future labor force participation in testing the human capital theory of job and occupational sex-segregation. The use of expectations data in estimating such reduced form model specifications raises a number of important concerns.
In a dynamic framework, expectations of future decisions and outcomes are functions of current information sets and thus will generally depend on the same observables and unobservables that affect current decisions. For example, expected future social security benefits will depend on the planned date of retirement and the expected future earnings until that date, which will generally have the same determinants as current work and savings decisions. Thus preferences and skills are likely to determine both current saving behavior as well as future social security benefits. As a result, treating subjective expectations as exogenous explanatory variables is likely to lead to endogeneity biases. et al (2010) , who studied college major choices. In these studies it is assumed that individuals maximize the expected returns or benefits associated with a set of alternatives, where the net return or utility level associated with a given choice is specified explicitly as a function of preferences and expected outcomes. By directly using survey data on individuals subjective expectations of outcomes, preferences can be recovered without requiring assumptions on how agents evaluate the likelihood of future events, therefore reducing the risk of misspecification 5 Lochner(2007) explicitly deals with the potential endogeneity of the perceived probability of arrest in evaluating its effect on criminal behavior by using an instrumental variables approach. After first differencing out unobserved fixed effects, (twice) lagged criminal and arrest histories of the individual and the individual's sibblings serve as instruments for beliefs about the probability of arrest.
biases.
While an important step forward, there are several important limitations to the approach adopted in these studies. First, its applicability is restricted to choice models in which relevant expected future returns can be fully captured by a finite set of measurable summary statistics. For example, if realizations of outcomes are correlated across choice alternatives, one generally would need to measure the entire joint subjective distribution of future choice-specific outcomes.
6 Furthermore, while the use of subjective expectations data in the estimation of structural choice models has been limited to models that are essentially Note that unless one relies on risk-neutrality of preferences, a comparison of expected returns would generally involve measuring not just the means but the whole outcome distributions conditional on choosing each alternative.
7 Zafar (2009a) and Arcidiacono et al (2010) need to rule out such switching in their empirical models. 8 There is also potential for endogeneity caused by cognitive dissonance, where individuals report beliefs that are consistent with their behavior, as well as estimation biases due to reporting errors such as those associated with rounding (Zafar 2010).
formation process. Thirdly, the approach does not require one to understand how individual form expectations. However, without an explicit model describing how expectations are formed, knowing preferences by themselves would not be sufficient for addresssing many interesting policy questions. Generally, to conduct counterfactual policy analyses with the goal of predicting behavior under a variety of conditions, one would need to understand and take into account how a new set of conditions will affect individual expectations.
These different limitations imply that in modeling most intertemporal choice decisions or decision making under uncertainty it will be difficult to circumvent altogether the need to impose some structure on the expectations formation process and on the way in which expectations may affect behavior. To fruitfully use subjective expectations data to explain observed choice behavior, one generally will need to explicitly model the expectations formation process jointly with a model of how expectations affect current choice behavior.
Instead of specifying a model that, with the available expectations data, can be estimated without having to making any assumptions regarding the expectations formation process, in this paper I take a more conventional approach in specifying a dynamic model of teacher career decisions where individuals are assumed to have rational expectations and to maximize expected lifetime utility. After estimating the model using observed choice data, I then evaluate whether reported subjective expectations about future occupation and employment status are consistent with the expectations implied by the model. Finally, I explore how such data can be integrated into the estimation of the model. In the next section I begin by presenting a simple model of teacher career choices.
III. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TEACHER CAREER DECISIONS
The model presented below characterizes each individual's initial occupational choice decision of whether or not to become a teacher as well as subsequent occupational mobility decisions (ie. exit out of and re-entry into teaching) in each year since graduating from a teacher training program. These career choices are constrained by the arrival of teaching job offers. The model also incorporates the labor force participation decision itself to ex-plain temporary exits (particularly of women) from the labor market. Each occupational choice and work decision involves a tradeoff between pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards in the teaching and non-teaching sector, as well as the utility derived when not working in the labor market. Because individuals face uncertainty about current and future economic conditions, these career decisions involve a formation of expectations about future earnings, non-pecuniary benefits and employment opportunities in each occupation. In this sense the model is similar to those of Gotz and McCall (1985) and Keane and Wolpin (1997) .
Upon graduating from a teacher training program each graduate is assumed to maximize the present value of utility over a known finite horizon (T) by choosing whether to work as a teacher (if such a job is available), work in the non-teaching sector, or choose not to work in the labor market. The objective of the individual is to maximize
where the utility function is specified as
by choosing a path {(P t ∈ I t , C t ∈ ); t = 1, · · · , T }, where the choice decision P t equals P t = 0 if the individual opts for the non-market alternative, P t = 1 when choosing to work as teacher, and P t = 2 if deciding to work in the non-teaching sector. C t represents consumption in period t of a composite good, I( ) is the indicator function with I = 1 if the argument is true and I = 0 if not. I t represents the set of choice possibilities for P t in period t, δ is the subjective discount factor and E is the expectations operator.
In the specification of the utility function α represents the marginal utility of consumption and b 1t and b 2t represent the disutility of working in both sectors of the labor market, relative to the utility of staying at home. The disutility of working in each occupation (which could be negative) will depend on the individual's preferences for each different type of work and on the non-pecuniary benefits provided by the occupation. To model this, we specify
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, including the individual's race, sex, type of degree obtained, and a constant term. The vector S kt includes the time-varying variables age, and the individual's total number of years of work experience exp kt in occupation k since graduation from a teacher training program. Occupation specific work experience evolves over time according to the law of motion
The disutility and non-pecuniary benefits associated with working in occupation or sector k is thus allowed to depend on the individual's work experience, age and characteristics X. This dependence reflects both differences across individuals in tastes for working in occupation k as well the varying degree of access within each occupational sector to jobs with higher non-pecuniary benefits. The stochastic components u kt in (3) represent unobserved individual differences in preferences and non-pecuniary returns in period t which, as discussed below, can be serially correlated.
The period specific budget constraint is given by
where N t represents non-labor income in period t, and W kt are the wage earnings an individual receives in period t when choosing occupation k. Wage earnings in each employment sector depend on total work experience in that occupation, a vector Z of individual characteristics affecting the earnings in occupation k, as well as a quadratic trend in calender time (with yr t representing the calender year corresponding to period t), to capture a trend in average teacher salary levels over time:
The vector Z includes a constant, the individual's race, sex, types of degrees obtained, and SAT score. It further includes the state's average manufacturing wage earnings over the sample period, as an indicator of the average strength of regional demand for labor. Teacher salary schedules differ from school district to district but within a school district depend solely on educational background and teaching experience. The vector of individual characteristics Z was included in the teacher wage equation to allow for the possibility that teachers with desirable characteristics may be able to obtain jobs in better paying school districts. The average state's manufacturing wages were included in the teacher wage equation as a (crude) proxy for variations in the average teaching salary across states and school districts. Note that while nonteaching wages may depend on teaching experience, teacher salaries do not depend on exp 2t as actual teacher salary schedules do not depend on nonteaching work experience.
Earnings in each occupation are further stochastic, depending on a random component ν kt with mean zero, representing stochastic fluctuations in earnings over time. At the time of each period's choice decision each individual knows both the current value of W kt in each sector k, as well as the wage structure in (6) and (7), but does not know the future values of W kt .
The correlation structure of the different error terms in the model is specified as follows:
where µ k denotes a person-and alternative-specific time-invariant disturbance and κ k are wage-specific factor loadings. The component ω t represents transitory unobserved changes in the disutility of working across individuals and over time and the ξ kt are individual specific transitory wage shocks. The three transitory random components ξ 1t , ξ 2t and ω t are assumed to be joint normally distributed with variance-covariance matrix Σ, to be independently distributed over time and individuals, and to be uncorrelated with µ 1 and µ 2 .
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The distribution of the permanent unobserved heterogeneity components µ 1 and µ 2 is specified to be discrete joint multinomial. Accordingly, we distinguish between J different "types" of individuals, where each type j, j = 1, · · · , J is characterized by a different vector
The population proportions of each type are given by
In the estimation of the model I allow for 4 types of individuals who differ in the values of µ 1 and µ 2 , each of which can take on two different values, representing a low or high preference for working in each occupation. 11 The population proportions are 10 Identification requires a normalization of one of the parameters. var(ω t ) was therefore fixed to 1. 11 See van der Klaauw (1996) for a similar specification of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
defined as
Note that, by allowing µ 1 and µ 2 to be correlated, the u kt and ν kt will be correlated across time and across choice alternatives.
One aspect of each period's occupational choice decision that has not yet been discussed, concerns the definition and evolution over time of the choice set I t . During the seventies and eighties, the time period covered by our data, the number of individuals seeking and applying for teaching jobs greatly exceeded the number of vacancies in teaching. Rather than assuming that each individual has the option to work as teacher in each period, I
will therefore allow for the possibility that the choice set I t may not include the teaching option in some periods. In addition, I will allow the probability of such an event to vary across individuals, by characterizing the realization of a teaching job offer in each period by an arrival rate which depends on a vector of individual characteristics Y t , containing the individual's race, degree background, age and teaching experience. It is further assumed that all individuals currently teaching (with P t−1 = 1) will always have the option to remain in teaching. Given that during the sample period of our data few teachers were laid off, I do not believe this to be a very restrictive assumption. Accordingly, the arrival rate is specified as:
where J 0 = {P t ∈ (0, 1, 2)}, J 1 = {P t ∈ (0, 2)} and Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function. The probability of receiving a teaching job offer in each period is assumed to be known to the individual.
In deciding each period whether to work in the teaching, non-teaching or household sector, the individual compares the sum of current and expected discounted future utility associated with each option. Expected future utility in turn depends on the expected future growth in wage earnings and in non-pecuniary benefits, i.e. on the rate of return to total and occupation specific work experience, in each sector. The dependence of wage earnings, the disutility of working (or nonpecuniary benefits of working) as well as future teaching job offer arrival rates on the individual's employment history, therefore causes an individual to consider in the current decision its effects on future utility levels and choices through a change in work experience. If work experience accumulated in one occupational sector has a lower wage return in the other, we can expect occupational mobility to decline with the number of years in the labor market. A high return to work experience will also lead to an increase in the opportunity cost of leaving the labor force.
The Dynamic Programming Solution
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function, utility equals
The individual's maximization problem in each period t, t = t 0 , ..., T can then be stated as follows:
where Ω t is the relevant information set or state space in period t, containing all factors known to the individual in that period which either affect current returns or the probability distribution of future returns, and where d ks = 1 if alternative k is chosen in period s and d ks = 0 if not and 2 k=0 d ks = 1. An alternative 'reduced form' representation of the maximization problem can be obtained by substituting both earnings equations into the utility function in (9). The utility levels associated with each choice alternative can then be defined as
where the reduced form coefficients λ i are functions of the utility and the occupation specific earnings equations parameters, and the vector X t consists of all explanatory variables in equations (3), (6) and (7) combined. The composite errors are defined as kt = αξ kt − ω t and, given the distributional assumptions made earlier, are joint normally distributed.
Given the utility function specification above, the maximum expected present discounted value of lifetime utility at time t, t < T , equals
where the information set Ω t at time t contains the current realizations of the error terms it , the vector X t (which includes measures of the decision history until t), the values of µ 1 and µ 2 and the choice set I t . The expectation in (11) is taken with respect to all stochastic components in Ω t+1 , including the realization of next period's choice set (i.e., the arrival of teaching job offers), and the realization of the stochastic earnings and utility components, conditional on Ω t and d it = 1.
It is possible to derive all V t (Ω t ) functions t = 1, .., T and to solve for the optimal policy at each t by exploiting the finite horizon nature of the dynamic programming problem. In
Further, for each period t < T and for each state vector X t and error vector µ, we can define two values * kt (X t , µ), k = 1, 2 such that
Then the optimal policy for each information vector X t and heterogeneity vector µ when the choice set I t = J 0 equals:
and when I t = J 1 :
The two values * 1t and * 2t divide the 2 dimensional space up into three regions in each of which one (assuming no ties) of the alternatives is optimal. Given the specified normal distribution for the kt 's, the decision rule in each period, the terminal value function V T and the Bellman equation (11), it is possible to solve, by backward recursion, for all V t (Ω t ) functions and all * kt values. Note that this involves the calculation of the expectations E[V t+1 (Ω t+1 )|d it = 1, X t , µ] which each involves the evaluation of a bivariate normal intergral. Table 1 about here]
For each individual the choice of each alternative i is observed for each individual k for T k periods. In the periods in which the individual works, also the wage earnings are observed. Let the decision set for individual k be d 
] be the sequences of the teacher and nonteacher earnings observed for individual k, elements of which will be zero (missing) if in that period the individual did not work in that sector, or if earnings data are missing.
The objective is to estimate the structural parameters, θ, given the observed data on the individuals' choices and occupation specific earnings, where θ includes the utility function parameters (α and the β kj parameters), the parameters in the two earnings equations, (γ 1 and γ 2 ), the teaching job offer probability parameters (ω), the discount factor (δ) and the error distribution parameters, ρ 1 , ρ 2 , {q j , j = 1, · · · , J}, κ 1 , κ 2 and Σ.
Estimates of the structural parameters of the model can be obtained using relatively standard maximum likelihood methods.
12 Given the optimal policy in (13') and (13") it is possible to calculate for each pair of vectors (X t ,µ) the probability that alternative i is chosen in period t as
where Υ = P r(I t = J 0 | P t−1 = k) is the arrival rate of teaching job offers defined earlier. The choice probabilities P r(d it = 1|X t , µ, J k ) for each choice set J k and alternative i are equal to the probability that the values of the two normally distributed error terms 1t and 2t satisfy the conditions described in (13') and (13"). The calculation of these choice probabilities therefore requires the evaluation of a bivariate normal integral. For example,
where φ(·, ·) represents the joint normal density function of 1t and 2t .
The likelihood function for our sample of K individuals is then defined as
where the conditioning on θ and µ j in the second equation has been omitted to simplify notation. The joint probability terms can further be written as the product of a conditional and marginal probability as follows:
] is equal to the probability that the chosen alternative is the optimal one (given the employment history and the values of the current period's wage offers), which is equal to the probability, for each possible choice set I t , that the draw of the ( it ) i∈It vector falls in the region of the ( t ) space where the chosen alternative is optimal. With normally distributed 's, the likelihood function equals the product of weighted averages of multinomial probit probabilities such as the one in (15). Thus estimating the model involves calculating these probabilities for each individual and time period. As we saw earlier, the backward recursive solution to the dynamic programming problem will provide us with these probabilities. [ Table 2 about here]
The estimates of the structural parameters are shown in table 2.
13 Considering first the earnings equation estimates, the most interesting results are the much higher returns in the nonteaching sector for having a Masters degree, a science degree and a higher SAT score, as well as the relatively large gender wage gap in the nonteaching sector relative to the teaching sector. The estimate of α, the marginal utility of consumption, is large and positive significant, which implies that wage considerations are important in decisions to enter and remain in teaching. The positive coefficients of exp 1t and exp 2t indicate that the disutility of working in either sector increases with previous work experience, and the negative coefficient on age implies that utility associated with working in the teaching sector declines with age.
The arrival rate parameter estimates show that the probability of receiving a teaching job offer was greater for those with a Bachelors degree in education and for individuals who were somewhat older. Those with more teaching experience, on the other hand were less likely to receive a teaching job offer than those with less teaching experience, possibly reflecting the tradeoff between hiring better and more experienced teachers and hiring less costly inexperienced teachers. The error covariance estimates reveal a positive correlation between the two wage errors of about 0.6 and negative correlations between the disutility of working error u t and the two wage errors. The estimates of the heterogeneity distribution parameters reveal the presence of significant permanent unobserved heterogeneity. [ Table 3 about here]
I will interpret the answer to the posed question on the expected occupation and labor force status at the age of 30, to represent the choice alternative which at the current date has the greatest probability of maximizing the individual's utility at age 30, that is, the alternative with the greatest probability of being chosen at age 30 (i.e. the mode). With this interpretation, it is clear that these expectations or intentions data contain information about individual choice behavior. Future behavior will depend in part on conditions known to the individual at the time of the survey and in part on events that have not yet occurred and are not perfectly foreseable. In our model the actual stochastic process generating these subsequent events (the random preference shock u t , the arrival of teaching job offers, and future wage shocks ν 1t and ν 2t ) has been specified up to a vector of unknown parameters.
Given these specifications and the associated optimal decision rules (13') and (13"), each future period's choice probabilities can be calculated for each possible work history in that future period. Consequently, it is possible to calculate the age 30 choice probabilities conditional on the current period's work history. These future choice probabilities will be a function of the same parameters that determine the current choice probabilities and work decisions.
More formally, given the specified structure of the individual's maximization problem and given values of the parameters, the expected probability of choosing a particular alternative at age 30 corresponds to the probability that the error terms 1 and 2 in the corresponding period take values such that inequalities (13') or (13") hold, where this probability is calculated conditional on the current information set. This structure therefore allows us to calculate these future choice probabilities for each individual (and each type). Under the assumption that the behavioral model is correct (and ignoring sampling variation that causes the estimated parameters to differ from the true parameters), the alternative with the largest choice probability, i.e. the most likely choice at age 30 at the current date, should then equal each individual's self-reported most likely choice at age 30.
Let us define the calculated or implied expected choice probabilities at age 30, given current information, as P * 0 , P * 1 and P * 2 where P * j = P r(d jt+m = 1|X t , d t , µ l ) for j = 0, 1, 2, where t + m represents the year in which the individual is 30 years old. Then, with ES t representing the expected (or most likely) choice in period t+m reported in year t, as defined above, we have (for each type µ l )
for all i = 0, 1, 2, where the P r(d jt+m = 1|X t , d t , µ l ), j = 0, 1, 2 can be calculated as described earlier.
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Incorporation of these probabilities in the likelihood function will make the likelihood function discontinuous and non-differentiable. 16 This problem is resolved once we allow for the possibility that individuals make errors in reporting their expectations 17 . It is likely that respondents may not take sufficient time to give a precise answer when responding to survey questions about expectations, but use more precise forecasts when making actual career choices and in reporting choices made. While individuals are assumed to calculate future choice probabilities (the P r(d jt+m = 1|X t , d t , µ l )) correctly, instead of reporting the maximum of these probabilities, we assume that they report each alternative with probability
Note that as r → 0 these probabilities will approximate those in (16), that is if r = 0, individuals would in fact report the alternative with the greatest expected future probability.
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Thus r provides a measure of the degree of misreporting.
Note that in comparison to (16), the degree by which the choice probabilities in (17) will differ from 1 and 0 will depend on how similar to each other the future choice probabilities are.
If one alternative clearly has the greatest future probability of being chosen, the probability that the individual will report that alternative will be close to 1. On the other hand, when two choices are almost equally likely to be chosen in future period t+m (in which case it may be more difficult for the individual to determine the one with the maximum probability), the reported expected future state could be either with equal probability and the probability of a reporting error will be greatest.
16 A similar problem arises in the case of the maximum score estimator of Manski (1975; . There the goal is to choose parameter values which maximize the number of correct choice predictions, where a prediction is either correct or incorrect. The likelihood function becomes a stepfunction, complicating the maximization routine as well the derivation of the asymptotic properties of the estimator.
17 Bernheim (1988; 1990) finds indirect evidence of the existence of reporting errors in expectations. In the job search literature, subjective reservation wages are similarly assumed to be measured with error.
18 Note that when r becomes small, our allowance for reporting errors has the same effect, or plays the same role as the smoothing method proposed by Horowitz (1992) to overcome the discontinuous and nondifferentiable likelihood problem for the maximum score estimator.
The expectations data can now be incorporated into the likelihood function to obtain
and s equals the year in which the expectation about year s + m was reported (where for notational convenience we have omitted a superscript k on s and m).
When incorporating the expectations data into the likelihood function we implicitly assume that the expectations data are consistent with observed individual behavior and with the specified behavioral model. This may in fact not be the case. It may be the case that respondents did not understand the question or provided random responses, thereby invalidating the expectations data. Use of these data in that case could lead to biased estimates.
One way to test for the validity of the reported expectations is to compare the reported expectations with actual realizations. In our case we could simply compare the proportions of individuals expecting to work as teacher, work as non-teacher or expecting not to work at age 30 with actual choices at age 30. Table 3 shows that the reported expectations do in fact correspond reasonably well to the actual choices at age 30. The off-diagonal counts can then be explained by the fact that the sample size is relatively small, or by reporting errors or by the fact that the predicted choices are based on estimated parameters. However, as pointed out by Manski (1990) , such validity or rationality tests are invalid in the case of binary intentions data, such as those considered here.
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As a second validation test, we can test whether the subjective responses are consistent with the optimal future behavior as implied by the behavioral model and the objective data on actual choices. Using the estimated parameters, we can determine the alternative with the maximum expected future choice probability as explained earlier, for each of the J types (unobserved heterogeneity values). Further, given our estimates we can assign type probabilities to each individual. Using Bayes'rule, the probability that an individual k is type j is q j · L kj /L k . We can then compare each individual's selfreported expected future choice with that predicted by the model for the individual's most likely type. A good fit would validate the subjective expectations question, under the assumption that our model is correct. Small differences between the reported and predicted choices can be explained by the fact that the prediction was based on an (imprecise) estimate of the individual's type and on estimated parameters, and by the presence of reporting errors. Table 4 gives a cross-tabulation of the reported responses with the predicted choices implied by the model. There is a fairly close correspondence between the two. A chi-square test rejects their equality at the 95% but not at the 99% level 20 . The second part of the table shows that the predictions implied by the model are always closer to actual behavior at age 30 than the self-reported expectations, which may be an indication of the existence of reporting errors, but should also not be very surprising given that the model was estimated using the actual choice data (including the choices at age 30). Overall, the table shows that the model is able to explain both actual future choices and reported intentions data quite well.
[ Table 4 about here]
So far, we have assumed that individuals were asked to choose from among the three different choice alternatives considered in our model (not-working, teaching, non-teaching occupation). However, in the survey individuals were provided a larger choice set which included several different non-teaching professions. It is easy to show that answers may differ when a larger choice set is offered instead of the three alternatives considered in our model. In our case it may not be unreasonable to assume, however, that in answering the question the individuals in our sample (who are all qualified teachers) adopted a two-stage approach consistent with the model: one where in the first stage the probabilities of working as teacher, nonteacher and not working are compared and the alternative with the greatest probability is identified. Then, in the second stage, if the individual chose the nonteaching 20 The χ 2 statistic is 7.9, while χ 2 (2, 0.05) = 5.99 and χ 2 (2, 0.01) = 9.21.
sector (i.e., the probability of working in the nonteaching sector at age 30 is the greatest), the individual selects the most likely alternative from amongst the 15 different nonteaching occupations.
It is important to stress that this assumption about the way in which an individual provides an answer to a particular question is much less of an ad-hoc assumption than it may initially appear. When using the actual choice data (where individuals report their current occupation by choosing from the same list of occupations) to estimate the model we have similarly implicitly assumed that individuals choose from among the three sectors in the two-stage manner described, and we similary ignore the second-stage choice decision and the data on the actual nonteaching occupation chosen. 21 For example, if someone reports to be employed as manager in a particular year, we similary interpret this in the context of our model as though the individual had chosen the nonteaching sector. Thus both actual choice data and expectations data are treated entirely symmetrically.
Incorporating the expectations data with reporting errors, the likelihood function is exactly that in (18). Estimates are presented in table 5. In general, they are very similar to those in table 2, providing additional evidence that the expectations data are consistent with the observed choice data and with the behavioral model. The reporting error variance is 0.33 and is significantly different from zero. In general, the estimates have smaller standard errors than those in table 2 (on average they are 5% smaller), reflecting the efficiency gains obtained from combining subjective expectations data with objective data on actual choice decisions.
[ Table 5 about here]
Besides the gain in efficiency, a related benefit from using subjective expectations data in the way described in this paper, concerns an increase in accuracy in forecasting future individual behavior and outcomes. As shown above, data on choice expectations provide valuable information about an individual's unobserved "type" or about unobserved characteristics. Using Bayes' rule, one can derive posterior probabilities of each individual's type, which can be used to improve forecasting of future individual behavior.
The same applies to models in which individuals' unobserved perceptions or beliefs of 21 It is interesting to note that while these type of assumptions about the decision process are commonly made in order to match data with a proposed theoretical model, they are almost never explicitly stated.
the state of the economy or state of the world is modelled through some (possibly time- This paper represents a first exploration in this direction, by presenting a methodology for the incorporation of subjective data on choice expectations in the estimation of stochastic dynamic choice models. While applied to a study of teacher career decisions, it is general to other life cycle decisions. Using information about self-reported career expectations, it was shown that such data could be readily incorporated in the estimation of the model, under similar assumptions required to analyze objective choice data. While the efficiency gain from incorporating data from a single expectations question in our application was rather modest, one can expect this gain to become more substantial as the number of incorporated expectations increases.
An issue not explicitly addressed in this paper concerns the general quality of subjective expectations data. While the interpretation of the answers to the expectation question used here seems logical, it is clear that there is a need for more carefully worded and more detailed expectations questions. For example, to avoid any ambiguity about whether a question or response relates to a mean, median, or mode of a variable (and also to measure uncertainty about future outcomes) it would be preferable to elicit information about each individual's complete subjective probability distribution of future realizations as in, for example, Dominitz and Manski (1997a), Engelberg et al (2009) and Bruine de Bruin et al (2010b) . It also would be useful if the question spelled out in more detail what an expected probability or the expectation should be conditioned on. For example, when asking someone whether or not they expect to work at age 65 (or the probability of such an event), it may not be obvious to the interviewee whether the question is conditional or unconditional on surviving to age 65, especially for individuals with an illness.
Finally, an important topic for future research is to study how and whether expectations data could be used to relax some of the assumptions inherent in most structural dynamic models of decision behavior under uncertainty, about the way in which expectations are formed. While in this paper we have maintained the assumption that expectations are rational, expectations data could help identify the ways in which different agents form and update expectations. For example, they could be used in estimating models that incorporate adaptive learning or models with heterogeneity across individuals in expectations formation, with some being rational, others adaptive or using another boundedly rational approach as in the rationally heterogenous expectations model of Branch (2004 Table 4 Predicted, expected and actual future occupation at age 30 , in 1973, 1974, 1976, 1979 and 1986 . In addition, the final survey included a special teacher supplement, which focused on the 1517 individuals in the sample who, during the 1972-1986 period, had taught or had become qualified to teach. The NLS-72 surveys combined provide a valuable source for the study of the early career decisions and mobility patterns of a cohort of high school and college graduates. It also contains detailed information on wages and educational background, including measures of academic ability and course subjects. Most important for our study, the NLS-72 population includes a relatively large national sample of school teachers, thereby representing one of the most comprehensive sources of information on the labor market experiences of school teachers.
I will restict my analysis to the subsample of individuals who were part of the fifth followup survey and who became eligible or qualified to teach, i.e. who graduated from a teacher training program, during the 1976-1979 period. I define the latter group to be all individuals who received at least one of the following (1) a Bachelors degree in education, (2) a Masters degree in education or (3) a teaching certificate. The first observation year for each individual in the sample is then the year in which the individual has become qualified to teach and has left full-time education. The final observation year for most individuals is the final survey year 1986, but for a small number instead will be the year after which information about their career history was missing or incomplete. For the resulting unbalanced panel of 817 individuals, the average number of years available is about 9 years per individual (see Table 1 ).
An individual is defined to teach in a particular year (P t = 1) if he or she was teaching in October of that year, and did not also report to be in full-time education that month.
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Similarly a person is defined to be employed in a non-teaching job (P t = 2) in a year if the person was employed in such a job in October of that year and not enrolled full-time in college.
Those not-working in a particular year includes all individuals working at home, enrolled 22 While information is available about the individual's work status in all other months as well, this information was found to be somewhat less reliable than that for the status in October. The first 4 follow-up surveys were all conducted in October or shortly thereafter and individuals were asked about their status in that month specifically, reducing potential recall errors. and exp 2t represent the individual's age in the first period, the individual's total teaching experience and total years of work experience in the non-teaching sector.
The means and standard deviations of the variables are shown in table 1. Because of oversampling of various subgroups (including oversampling of school teachers) the NLS-72 sample does not constitute a nationally representative random sample of the population of all school teachers in this cohort. Therefore sample weights were applied in all estimations.
To obtain an idea of the extent of occupational mobility in the sample, table A1 shows the frequency counts of various career patterns. The table shows that only 244 individuals (30%) remained in the same labor force state throughout the sample period. 126 (15%) changed labor force status once (i.e. they had exactly two spells), and 185 (23%) had three spells.
The remaining 262 individuals (32%) experienced more than 3 different spells. Each letter represents a spell occurring over one or more years. O stands for out of labor force, T for teaching and N for employment in the non-teaching sector. Observed sequences end either at the end of the sample period (1986) or in the first year in which the occupation status is unknown. The first spell starts in the first year after graduation from a teacher training program in which the individual is no longer engaged in full-time study.
